I. INTRODUCTION
One of former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer's first priorities upon taking office in January 2007 was passing a sex offender civil commitment bill.
2 Enacted with bipartisan support, the law is part of a wave of legislation restricting the freedoms of convicted sex offenders after they have completed their sentences.
3 Following the passage of federal legislation that provided funding to states that enact restrictive measures, every state passed such measures.
county's residency restrictions. 9 A sex offender in Michigan froze to death on the street; shelters were forced to turn him away because they were located within one thousand feet of a school. 10 A computer technician in Washington State, convicted of soliciting an underage prostitute, and whose profile was posted on the state's online sex offender registry, was fired from four jobs and could not find an apartment.
11 A developmentally disabled, wheelchairbound man, previously convicted of charges related to exposing himself to a child, called the sheriff's office reporting that he wanted to kill himself. 12 He made the call after fliers were posted in his neighborhood identifying him and his conviction. 13 He was found dead the next day, apparently due to suicide.
14 These anecdotes describe the effects of restrictive measures on convicted sex offenders living in the community; the stigma and isolation are even more extreme for those who are civilly committed.
Civil commitment laws often are enacted after a highly publicized violent crime by a sex offender, 15 and a rush by elected officials to show they are "doing something." 16 Based on the popular and erroneous belief that sex offenders are highly recidivistic, 17 16 JANUS, supra note 7, at 13-16 (describing a pattern of passages of sex offender commitment laws following highly publicized rape-murders by recently released sex offenders in Washington, Minnesota and New Jersey). New York followed a similar pattern. Although Connie Russo Carrierro's murder by a convicted sex offender was not as widely publicized across the state, it drew a great deal of media attention in Westchester. The man who killed her had been ejected from a homeless shelter, resulting in a monitoring system for sex offenders and calls by the Westchester County Executive, Andrew Spano, for a civil commitment law. (1997) (summarizing the research on re-arrest rates: "sex offenders are arrested and/or convicted of committing a new sex crime at a lower rate than other offenders who commit other new non-sexual crimes"); JANUS, supra note 7, at 91-92 (arguing that sex offender laws undo feminist work on understandings of
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[Vol. 12:283 offender civil commitment laws are bad public policy. 18 States that have passed them now face heavy burdens, with burgeoning numbers of civilly committed sex offenders and a dearth of community placements after release 19 (though in some states few offenders are ever released). 20 Despite their popularity, the effectiveness of civil commitment laws is unproven. 21 What has been clearly documented, however, is that they are enormously expensive. 22 The even greater expense is to American constitutional principles.
Preventive detention raises obvious concerns about infringements on the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws and on double jeopardy. 23 But even constitutional infringements stemming from civil commitment that do not involve bodily restraint, such as limitations on First Amendment rights, are more than merely incidental: they reveal the practical implications of civil commitment's disregard for individuals' constitutional rights.
violence; focusing public attention on "predator violence" at expense of addressing the more common sources as well as the underlying causes of violence). 18 JANUS, supra note 7, at 61-66 (reviewing the benefits and costs of civil commitment laws). 19 Kan- sas to keep up with the costs of the program there; costs have risen from $1.2 million to nearly $6.9 million annually, and a state audit found that unless offenders are released from the program, costs will continue to rise). 20 VELÁSQUEZ, supra note 6, at 27. 21 Cohen & Jeglic, supra note 17, at 380. " [T] he current legal methodologies for controlling sex offenders are unproven and very much underresearched . . . . The public is relying upon sex-offender-related legislation to protect them from sex offenders, but the research on these methods has not been promising thus far. " Id. 22 While estimates of costs vary, there is general agreement that expenditures are high and rising. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 15 (noting that costs are spiraling, with state expenditures on civil commitment approaching $450 million annually. Civil commitment costs approximately $100,000 per year per person, compared to $26,000 per year for prisoners); JANUS, supra note 7, at 62-63 (stating that the average cost of civil commitment per sex offender is $75,000 annually; the total costs nationally are estimated at two hundred twenty-five to three hundred thirty-one million dollars annually); see VELÁSQUEZ, supra note 6, at 26 (estimating the cost in New York per sex offender at $225,000 annually). 23 See, e.g., JANUS, supra note 7, at 93-95 (arguing that civil commitment represents an ominous trend favoring suspension of constitutional rights in the name of preventing risks to public safety such as crime and terrorism); Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 121-22 (1999) (arguing that allowing civil commitment of sex offenders opens the door to the involuntary detention of all recidivists).
Courts and commentators have long viewed First Amendment protections as first among the individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights, a foundation underlying other protections. 24 The Supreme Court has noted that the protections of the First Amendment have a "preferred place" in the American constitutional scheme, and, therefore, "any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger." 25 The Court has struggled to reconcile these basic protections of individual rights with perceived threats to public safety and the national interest. 26 This Article will argue that the Court has veered in a dangerous direction in its civil commitment jurisprudence, as demonstrated by judicial treatment of civilly committed sex offenders' First Amendment claims. This approach exemplifies the jurisprudence of fear Justice Brandeis famously warned against: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. . . . It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears." 27 Part II of this Article places civil commitment in the context of the historical and ongoing practice of involuntarily confining people with mental illnesses. Part II also discusses the especial importance of judicial review given the political environment that has spawned sex offender civil commitment laws. Part III describes the Kansas v. Hendricks decision upholding sex offender civil commitment, in which the Court found that because Kansas's civil commitment law was not punitive, it did not violate the prohibitions on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. Part IV reviews the standards applied by courts to First Amendment claims brought by prisoners, focusing on the standard set out in Turner v. Safley. Part V describes federal courts' treatment of civilly committed sex offenders' free speech and free exercise of religion 24 pealed or stopped using the psychopath laws after the Supreme Court ruled that sex offenders could not be civilly committed until they had been found guilty of prior criminal acts, thereby ensuring procedural protections. 34 Unlike modern sex offender civil commitment laws, under sexual psychopath laws, civil commitment was an alternative to a criminal trial imprisonment.
By contrast, contemporary sex offender civil commitment laws provide for commitment after imprisonment. The civil commitment of sex offenders has required a new set of laws because sex offenders generally do not meet the definition of mental illness in the statutory requirements for civilly committing people with mental illnesses, though critics have charged that even "mental illness" is an ill-defined term.
35
Sex offenders are a "discrete, insular minority" 36 whose constitutional rights are subject to infringement by a democratic majority's impulse to keep them "behind bars."
37 If judicial review is essential to protect the rights of convicted felons, convicted sex offenders who have completed their sentences equally require such protection. It has been argued that the Supreme Court's extreme deference to prison administrators denies prisoners constitutional protections "where judicial review is most essential." 38 The same brand of deference removes protection from a population that is even more unpopular than the general class of prisoners, those 34 41 But where judicial review is most needed, the courts have adopted an extremely deferential approach, giving civil commitment center administrators wide berth to curtail sex offenders' constitutional rights.
The glaring constitutional problem with civil commitment is that it violates the basic protections in the criminal justice system by moving sex offenders to the civil arena where protections are more limited. 42 The Supreme Court has not recognized this constitutional infirmity. In Kansas v. Hendricks 45 The Court's decision hinged on its finding the statute's provisions were not punitive, as they implicated neither retribution nor deterrence, "the two primary objectives of criminal punishment."
46
The challenged statute provided for the civil commitment of persons who are likely to commit "predatory acts of sexual violence" due to a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" 47 and required specific procedures for inmates already confined to prison, including a jury trial, a right to counsel and cross examine witnesses, and annual review by the committing court. 48 Hendricks, a convicted sex offender scheduled for release from prison soon after the statute was enacted, challenged his commitment on substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds. 49 Hendricks appealed the Kansas trial court's civil commitment order, and the Kansas Supreme Court found that the Act violated his substantive due process rights. 50 Under the statute, involuntary civil commitment required a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a person is both mentally ill and a danger to him-or herself or others, but the Act's definition of mental abnormality did not satisfy the mental illness requirement. 51 The majority did not reach Hendricks's ex post facto or double jeopardy claims. that involuntary commitment statutes are not contrary to "our understanding of ordered liberty" so long as they include appropriate procedural protections and evidentiary standards. 53 The Court disagreed with the Kansas Supreme Court's holding that the requirement of mental defect or personality disorder was constitutionally defective, finding that mental illness is "devoid of talismanic significance" and therefore is not the only mental impairment that can pass constitutional muster. 54 The Court found that Hendricks satisfied the statutory requirement of lacking volitional control based on a diagnosis of pedophilia and Hendricks's admission that he was unable to control his urge to molest children. 55 Relying on the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez factors for determining whether a law is penal or regulatory in nature, 56 the Court found that the Kansas civil commitment statute was not punitive. In applying the factors, 57 the Court noted the absence of several characteristics of criminal laws. The Act's use of prior criminal conduct was solely for evidentiary purposes: to show mental abnormality or future dangerousness. 58 That neither a criminal conviction nor a finding of scienter was required indicated that the statute was not retributive. 59 The Court rejected Hendricks's claim that the lack of treatment given him showed that confinement is "disguised punishment," and it noted that incapacitation was a legitimate goal 53 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357. 54 Id. at 358-59. 55 Id. at 360. 56 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (holding that a statute divesting an American citizen of citizenship for leaving the country to evade military service at a time of war was unconstitutional). The Hendricks decision holds that scienter is an element, but Kennedy lists it among seven factors. See generally id. 57 The factors are described as follows: "Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment, retribution [,] and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face." Id. at 168-69. 58 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362. The Court did not address the prejudicial effect of such evidence. Juries and judges aside, even clinicians' professional judgment can be biased by "vivid or emotionally laden information." Robert A. Prentky given the finding of the state supreme court that treatment was unavailable and Hendricks might be untreatable. 60 Even though the Kansas Supreme Court found that treatment was not the primary goal, it could still be an ancillary goal. 61 Regardless, the court decided the Act was not punitive. 62 The Court noted that the States have wide latitude in developing treatment regimens.
63
The Court based its findings on several assertions by the state: (1) the intent of civil commitment was not punitive, a small segment of "particularly dangerous" persons were confined; (2) treatment was recommended if possible; and (3) the statute permitted immediate release when the person no longer met the statutory criteria. 64 The Court then concluded that because the Act was not punitive or criminal, Hendricks did not have sufficient basis for double jeopardy or ex post facto claims. Justice Breyer's dissent found an ex post facto clause prohibition on the Act, as it inflicted a greater punishment on Hendricks than the law ascribed to his crimes. 66 Justice Breyer reasoned that while an incapacitative law's lack of concern for treatment is not sufficient to make the law punitive, the State's assertion that treatment exists, and its delay of treatment until after the completion of a criminal sentence suggests a punitive purpose. 67 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Kansas had found that segregation was the primary purpose of the statute, with treatment "incidental at best." 68 The Supreme Court of the United States normally defers to state court interpretations of its own laws, and the record supported the Kansas court's conclusion. 69 Justice Breyer observed that Hendricks received no treatment for the first ten months of his civil commit- 60 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363, 365. 61 Id. at 367. 62 Id. 63 Id. at 368 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ). The quality of treatment in sex offender commitment facilities is uneven at best, and professional standards are lacking. In one facility in Florida, only one of hundreds of detainees was deemed ready for release while the underfunded facility was administered by a private contractor. Abby Goodnough & Monica Davey, A Record of Failure at Center for Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007. "Many outside experts, even some of the center's critics, said the state's insufficient financing of the center made Florida as much to blame as Liberty for the many failings, many of which are common in other states." Id. 64 Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 59, at 368-69. 65 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369. 66 Id. at 379. 67 Id. at 381. By providing for treatment only years after an offense is committed, when the offender is nearing the completion of his or her sentence, the statute necessitates "further incapacitation" and therefore "begins to look punitive." Id. 68 Id. 69 Id.
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71
Incapacitation appeared to be the primary purpose of the statute as treatment was delayed until after the prison sentence was completed, and there was no provision for considering less restrictive alternatives (unlike in the civil commitment of persons with mental illness). 72 The state's assertion that civil commitment was not punitive was wholly unconvincing. 73 In a subsequent case, the Court clarified that while there need not be a complete lack of control, "there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior," in addition to proof of dangerousness and mental abnormality, to satisfy the requirements of civil commitment. 74 Hendricks has been criticized on a number of grounds, for: "strain[ing] the distinction between criminal punishment and civil commitment"; 75 creating criteria based on erroneous understandings of sex offending behavior; 76 relying on an "unacceptably fuzzy" mental abnormality standard; 77 ignoring the clear legislative purpose of the statute; 78 and, more fundamentally, authorizing 70 Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 59, at 383-84. 71 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 379-80 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11-12 (incapacitation is one important purpose of criminal punishment) and United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965) ("Punishment serves several purposes; retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment.")). 72 Id. at 389. 73 Id. 74 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 407 (2002) . 75 WINICK, supra note 28, at 120. 76 Id. at 128 (citing studies that show that sex offenders can control their behavior). 77 See Friedland, supra note 23, at 115, 117 (arguing that states have wide latitude to allow for the civil commitment of people with mental abnormalities and personality disorders, "giving rise to the specter of political agendas and capriciousness in the law's application."). 79 Scholars also note that predicting dangerousness on the basis of past crimes "would be 'impermissible character evidence' for other felony defendants." 80 The core constitutional problems of Hendricks are only amplified by the application of the prison standard to the constitutional claims of individuals with civil status.
IV. TURNER V. SAFLEY: EXTREME DEFERENCE TO PRISON ADMINISTRATORS Federal courts routinely apply an extremely deferential prison standard to the First Amendment claims of civilly committed sex offenders. Turner v. Safley established this extreme judicial deference to prison administrators for prisoners' First Amendment rights, 81 cementing the decade-long shift away from the high-level scrutiny courts had applied to infringements on prisoners' constitutional rights. Courts' approaches to prisoners' constitutional rights have been embodied in three phases in modern times. Federal courts adhered to the "hands-off" doctrine starting in the 1930s, refusing to protect prisoners from constitutional violations, partly on the basis of federalism.
82 Starting in the late 1960s, federal courts extended constitutional protections to many aspects of incarceration, including First Amendment rights and living conditions. 83 During this more protective period, under Procunier v. Martinez, the standard for First Amendment violations of prisoner rights was akin to strict scrutiny: the regulation had to further "an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression" and the limitation could be "no greater than necessary" to the interest involved. 84 This protective period phan also testified that the Act "will keep dangerous sex offenders confined past their scheduled prison sentence." Id. A 1977 case involving prisoners' rights to engage in activities related to union formation, including the use of bulk mailings, furthered the doctrinal shift: the Court criticized the lower court's failure to give "appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of penal confinement."
86 Two years later, the Court upheld a restriction prohibiting pretrial detainees from receiving hardcover books from sources other than publishers or bookstores.
87
The Turner decision announced a new era of extreme deference, citing the prior cases trending toward deference, noting that the Court applied heightened scrutiny to none of them, and rejecting the Eighth Circuit's use of Martinez's strict scrutiny standard over the deferential review of the later cases.
88
In Turner, prisoners challenged Mississippi Division of Corrections regulations restricting prisoner mail and marriage. 89 The marriage regulation prohibited inmates from marrying other inmates or non-inmates, unless the prison administration found compelling reasons to allow it. 90 The challenged mail regulations prohibited mail between inmates at different prisons, unless the inmates were immediate family members, corresponding about legal matters, or the prison administration had deemed such correspondence in the best interest of the parties. 91 which the plaintiffs were imprisoned, the rule in practice barred all inmates from writing incarcerated non-family members. 92 Inmates challenged the mail regulations as an infringement of their First Amendment rights under the free speech clause. 93 The Court held that the marriage regulation was not reasonably related to the asserted penological interests of promoting the rehabilitation of women through self-reliance or protecting security by preventing love triangles, but upheld the prison mail regulations, setting out an extremely deferential test: "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate interests." 94 A four-factor test determines the reasonableness of the regulation. First,"there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate [and neutral] governmental interest put forward to justify it." 95 The second factor is "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates" and the third factor is the "impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally." 96 The Court explained that when "accommodation of the asserted right will have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials." 97 The last factor is "the absence of ready alternatives" to the challenged regulation. If "obvious, easy alternatives" exist "at de minimis cost to valid penological interests," the regulation may not be reasonable. 98 The Court specified that this factor does not require that prison officials find the least restrictive alternative. 99 In applying the test, the Court found that the mail rule was reasonably related to "legitimate security interests," noting that it was content-neutral, and not an exaggerated response to legitimate safety and security concerns. 100 The Court compared mail between prisoners to parole conditioned on non-association with known criminals, reasoning that mail between prisoners "is a potential 92 Id. at 82. 93 101 As to the second factor, the court reasoned that alternative means of communication remain open because prisoners are able to correspond with non-prisoners. 102 Such a broad interpretation of alternative means weighs strongly in favor of an infringement's constitutionality. The Court's analysis of the third factor, in which it criticized the Eighth Circuit's decision, exhibits its new brand of super-deference: the Court noted that prison officials asserted that mail between inmates contributes to informal organizations that threaten safety and security, but mentions no evidence that supports the assertion. 103 As to the fourth factor, the plaintiffs proposed that inmate correspondence be monitored, rather than banned, but the Court found that this could not be achieved at de minimis cost, citing prison administrators' assertion that it would be impossible to read all correspondence, and that prisoners could still communicate in code. 104 Justice Steven's opinion, concurring as to the marriage regulation and dissenting as to the mail regulation, criticized the majority for accepting prison administrators' rationale, and ignoring the lower courts' finding that the justification for the rules was speculative. No facts were presented to support assertions that the rules furthered safety and security interests. 105 He noted that requiring no more than a "logical connection" between the challenged regulation and a legitimate penological goal provides almost no constitutional protection; "the use of bullwhips on prisoners" for the purpose of discipline could satisfy the logical connection requirement. 106 Justice Stevens criticized the majority's inconsistent approach, giving "virtually total deference" to prison administrators on the mail policy while discounting prison administration speculation about security risks related to marriage. 107 This inconsistent stance was contrary to the text of the Constitution, which "more clearly protects the right to communicate than the right to marry." 108 Commentators have echoed Stevens' criticisms, noting that 101 Id. at 91-92. 102 Id. at 92. 103 Id. 104 Id. at 93. 105 Id. at 106. 106 Turner, 482 U.S. at 101. 107 Id. at 113. 108 Id. at 116. the first factor of the Turner test is determinative, as the factors operate "like dominoes: Once the first and most weighty prong falls, the others do as well." 109 Furthermore, that first critical prong fails to differentiate between weak and strong rights. 110 Professor James E. Robertson has described Turner as "faux balancing" because while the decision appears to require the weighing of factors, the prisoner's infringed-upon right is entirely absent from the analysis. 111 Courts do not examine the degree of deprivation or importance of the right at issue, and therefore most any accommodation can be found onerous.
Subsequent cases followed Turner's extreme deference to prison administrators on prison mail, rather than the skepticism the Court had afforded the justifications for the marriage ban. Another five-to-four decision exemplified the new approach, this time applying the Turner test to a First Amendment free exercise of religion claim. 112 In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Court upheld work rules in a New Jersey prison that assigned prisoners to work details outside the prison, thereby preventing Muslim prisoners from attending a weekly service at the prison. 113 The Court found that the rules were logically connected to the legitimate purpose of maintaining "institutional order and security" as well as relieving overcrowding during the day. 114 The requirement of a full eight-hour workday was logically related to rehabilitation goals. 115 The decision afforded little importance to the second factor, interpreting alternative means broadly: after conceding that prisoners had no alternative means of exercising their right to attend the weekly service, 116 the Court concluded that because the service takes place at a specific time, as commanded by the Koran-every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith but before the afternoon prayer 117 -it was "extraordinarily difficult" for prison officials to accommodate. 118 The Court noted that in Turner, the analysis of this factor focused on whether prisoners were denied "all means of expression," rather than the means to communicate with other prisoners, and reasoned that prisoners were not denied all forms of religious exercise, only the ability to participate in the weekly service. 119 As to the impact on other inmates, prison personnel and the allocation of prison resources, the Court found that the alternatives suggested by the prisoners, allowing Muslim prisoners to work on-site or on weekends, would either undermine the goal of off-site work, require additional resources, promote the growth of affinity groups, which would threaten security, or create perceptions of favoritism. 120 The Court thus conflated the last two factors, coming to the conclusion that "there are no 'obvious, easy alternatives to the policy adopted by petitioners.'"
121
Outside of the context of prison rights cases, free exercise and free speech claims are analyzed under entirely distinct doctrinal lines.
122 Under the Turner test, it seems that all constitutional rights are equivalent in the eyes of the Court (with the exception, perhaps, of marriage). Accordingly, the criticisms of the test's application to free exercise and free speech claims are remarkably similar. Like Justice Stevens's dissent in Turner, Justice Blackmun's dissent in O'Lone points out that the Court accepted the prison administration's implausible reasons for rejecting alternative policies with no substantiation. 123 The prison arranged work schedules to accommodate Jewish and Christian inmates' attendance at their weekly services, but prison administrators asserted that such accommodation could not be made for Muslims and failed to explain why resulting Jewish-and Christian-affinity groups did not pose a security threat, while Muslims did. 124 This illustrates the problem of Turner extreme deference: while the Turner Court voiced concern for respecting the "policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints" and "the need to protect constitutional rights," 125 deference that requires no substantiation of the legitimate interests asserted by prison officials, is more than deference: it is practically a foregone conclusion.
126
Subsequent cases applied the Turner rule to other First Amendment claims by prisoners. Two years later, the Court upheld regulations allowing wardens to prohibit inmate's receipt of subscription publications if prison administrators found the specific publications detrimental to institutional security.
127
The Court also upheld policies that infringed on inmates' rights of association in the form of restrictive visitation policies, adding a new requirement to the Turner test: the burden is on the prisoner to disprove the validity of the challenged regulation, rather than on the administration to prove its validity. 128 An even harsher restriction on the receipt of publications was upheld by the Roberts Court, allowing prison administrators to forbid inmates in the highest security unit from receiving any newspapers, magazines, or photographs. 129 In Beard v. Banks, the Court granted summary judgment to prison officials after assessing just one of three asserted purposes of the restriction. After finding that "motivat [ing] better behavior on the part of particularly difficult prisoners" was a legitimate penological interest reasonably related to the challenged restriction, the Court felt no need to examine the other asserted rationales. 130 The Court noted that sufficient evidence was presented to show that the restrictions serve to advance that purpose: "namely, the views of the deputy superintendent." 131 The decision illustrates the importance of the first factor in determining the outcome of the Turner test. In analyzing the third factor, Justice Breyer reasoned that "[i]f the Policy (in the authorities' view) helps to produce better behavior, then its absence (in the authorities' view) will help to produce worse behavior, e.g., "backsliding."
132 Prison administrators' assertion that a policy is effective in furthering a legitimate penological purpose, is the beginning and end of the analysis; the rest of the factors are superfluous.
Professor James E. has been applied by lower federal courts far beyond its initial First Amendment application, to such constitutional rights as equal protection. 133 He argues that Turner exemplifies the Rehnquist Court's judicial minimalism, an approach that "accommodates and implicitly legitimates the countermajoritarian difficulty," skirting key questions, such as which constitutional rights are consistent with incarceration. 134 If it is troubling that all manner of prisoners' constitutional rights are being "Turnerized," the entry of "Turnerization" into the civil arena, through its application to the constitutional claims of civilly committed sex offenders, is even more alarming.
V. CIVIL STATUS IS CIVIL STATUS (EXCEPT WHEN IT'S NOT):
THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS BY CIVILLY COMMITTED SEX OFFENDERS The application of the Turner prison standard by federal courts to civilly committed sex offenders' First Amendment claims shows that the courts see little distinction between imprisonment and civil commitment. The Supreme Court is isolated in its view, articulated in Hendricks, that civil commitment is not imprisonment. 135 An examination of First Amendment cases illustrates how the conflation of prison and civil commitment operates.
Two of the most common First Amendment claims brought by civilly committed sex offenders are free speech clause challenges to mail policies in civil commitment facilities, and free exercise clause challenges to infringements on civil committees' religious practices. In both categories of claims, federal courts frequently rely on prison precedents, and fail to acknowledge any difference in the status of civilly committed sex offenders, as compared to the status of prisoners. 134 Id. at 118. 135 See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text. 136 Civilly committed sex offenders have also brought First Amendment claims based on retaliation for complaints or lawsuits. In these cases, courts also rely on the prison standard, but because prisoners' rights in this arena are clearly established, in this instance, courts need go no further than establishing the "floor." One particularly well-reasoned decision (although later reversed in a memorandum disposition and remanded to the circuit court of appeals) is in Hydrick v. Hunter, a class-action suit filed by California sex offenders who are civilly committed or detained awaiting com-
A. Free Speech Claims
In analyzing civilly committed sex offenders' challenges to mail policies, the courts often go no further than prison mail cases to conclude that either there is no First Amendment right, or no clearly established right for the purposes of overcoming a qualified immunity defense. The courts in these cases could just as easily be reviewing claims from prisoners. If civil commitment is not prison, the prison standard should establish the floor, but not the very architecture of the building.
Rivera v. Rogers 137 exemplifies the judicial approach that treats civilly committed sex offenders' First Amendment claims no differently than those of prison inmates. In Rivera, the Third Circuit considered a First Amendment claim by a civilly committed New Jersey sex offender, and started from the premise that "his status is similar to that of a prisoner . . . ."
138 The court affirmed the district court's decision granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment, referencing the district court's application of the Turner test. 139 The district court relied heavily on Waterman, a Third Circuit decision, quoting its pronouncement that "it is beyond dispute that New Jersey has a legitimate penological interest in rehabilitat- Ninth Circuit noted that in ascertaining whether a right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes, there are two relevant bodies of case law: rights afforded prisoners, which set the floor, and rights afforded other civilly detained persons, such as involuntarily hospitalized people with mental illnesses. Id. at 989. The court cited Youngberg's finding that civilly detained persons are entitled to "more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement" than inmates. Id. at 989 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)). After finding that protection from retaliation is a clearly established right for prisoners, the court noted that the involuntary hospitalization in Youngberg may not be entirely analogous to the civil commitment of sex offenders since "SVPs have been civilly committed subsequent to criminal convictions and have been adjudged to pose a danger to the health and safety of others," and so "the rights of SVPs may not necessarily be coextensive with those of all other civilly detained persons." Id. at 990. The court did not decide what the standard should be, because the issue was whether qualified immunity had been satisfied. It remains to be seen how the case will be decided on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court since the case was reversed without a written opinion. 137 The district court also cited Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court case that established that involuntarily committed persons with mental illnesses are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions than criminals, because, unlike criminals, their confinement is not punitive. 143 In Youngberg, the mother of a mentally retarded man who was involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State Hospital in Pennsylvania filed suit against hospital officials. Her son had suffered injuries more than seventy times, some of them self-inflicted and some inflicted by other patients. Some of the injuries, which included a broken arm, human bites, and black eyes, had become infected due to inadequate medical care and contact with human excrement. 144 Hospital staff kept him shackled to a bed or chair for long periods of time. 145 The suit claimed violation of his liberty interests in safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraint, and skills training. 146 The Court reasoned that because prisoners have a right to personal security, the involuntarily committed must as well: "[i]f it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily confined-who may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions."
147 However, the claim of a right to the training and development of needed skills (termed "habilitation") did not succeed. The Court found that the State has the discretion to decide which services are appropriate.
148
Decisions regarding treatment "if made by a professional" are "presumptively valid."
149
In Rivera, the district court noted that patients' constitutional rights "must be balanced against the reasons put forth by the State for restricting their liberties," then turned to Turner, strangely char- acterizing it as an expansion of Youngberg. 150 Youngberg and Turner are worth comparing: both involve constitutional claims by institutionalized persons. In both, the U.S. Supreme Court set out rules affording considerable deference to institutional administrators. 151 In setting out standards of review, both cases emphasize the importance of considering the purpose of the confinement. 152 Youngberg did not involve a First Amendment claim but a substantive due process claim based on liberty interests. 153 The levels of deference the two cases establish are different, if only by degrees. The deference to state hospital administrators in Youngberg, while strong, is not as complete as the deference to prison administrators in Turner. 154 In establishing a standard of review, Justice Powell's decision in Youngberg cites the standard articulated by the Third Circuit in Rivera: "the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment was in fact exercised." 155 The Court later qualifies this somewhat: while a decision made by a professional is presumptively valid, the decision may create liability if the professional's decision is "such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment." 156 152 See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321 (finding that the purpose of the plaintiff's confinement was to provide "reasonable care and safety" where his family was not able to provide it for him); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 93 (holding that a regulation that impinges on a prisoner's constitutional rights is valid "if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests"). 153 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. The challenge to the marriage restriction in Turner also was a substantive due process challenge. 154 This is not to suggest that Youngberg offers a model of judicial protection of constitutional rights. Youngberg has been strongly criticized for establishing a presumption of validity of professional decisions and eliminating the least restrictive means doctrine of care for people with mental disabilities. See . 1980) ). Youngberg defines a professional decisionmaker as "a person competent, whether by education, training [,] or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long-term treatment decisions normally should be made by persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care . . . necessarily will be made in many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject to the supervision of qualified persons." Id. at 323 n.30. 156 Id. at 323.
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157
Thus Youngberg establishes a standard that is very deferential to hospital administrators, but unlike Turner, presumably involves some examination of decisionmakers' qualifications and whether their decisions substantially depart from acceptable practices. Even while noting that courts should defer to professional judgment, the Youngberg Court opined that, given the facts of the plaintiff's case, "[i]t may well be unreasonable not to provide training when training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence." 158 In Turner, by contrast, the Court does not concern itself with the qualifications of prison administrators or the possibility of a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment. The decision draws on Bell v. Wolfish, which held that the "expert judgment" of prison administrators should be accorded "wide-ranging deference."
159 Wolfish has been criticized for ignoring the factual question of "whether [prison officials] actually possess such expertise." 160 The Third Circuit in Rivera invokes Youngberg in a token acknowledgment of the plaintiff's civil status, but proceeds to use the prison standard articulated by Turner as the framework for its analysis. The court's reliance on the district court's reasoning is troubling given the lower court's failure to differentiate between the status of prisoners and involuntarily committed persons and its seemingly reflexive decision to rely on prison standards. 161 The dis- trict court refers to civilly committed sex offenders variously as "patients," "residents," and "prisoners,"
162 sometimes switching terms in the same sentence: "Prisoners may still receive and send mail to whomever they wish, so long as a resident is not receiving contraband, pornographic material or sexually explicit correspondence." 163 The court is consistent in referring to "penological interests" throughout. 164 The Third Circuit echoes the district court's approach, noting that although "prisoners and those involuntarily committed, by virtue of their incarceration and custody status, 'do not forfeit their First Amendment right to use of the mails,'
165 that right can be limited by . . . legitimate penological interests."
166 If the plaintiff's constitutional rights can be infringed upon to further penological interests, 167 it follows that the court views his status as that of a prisoner incarcerated in a penological institution.
168
In applying the Turner test to Rivera's claim that his First Amendment rights were violated by the facility's policy of opening packages (with the exception of legal mail) mailed to prisoners, 169 the district court found that the facility's legitimate interests in safety and rehabilitation were furthered by the mail policy. Those interests and the policy were rationally related because harmful materials in the mail posed a threat to staff and patients and because sexually explicit material "could prove detrimental to a patient's rehabilitation."
170 Interestingly, the court cited Youngberg in analyzing the second factor of the Turner test, finding that persons committed to the units have alternative means of receiving and sending mail, so long as mail received did not include "contraband, pornographic material or sexually explicit correspon- . 163 Id. at *3 (emphases added). 164 Id. at *3, *4. 165 Rivera, 224 F. App'x at 151 (quoting Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a state prison's policy of opening mail outside of prisoners' presence was not reasonably related to its legitimate interest in protecting the safety and security of the prison in the wake of post-September 11 anthrax scares when the policy was still being followed three years later)). 166 172 Invoking Youngberg here did not change the analysis, however, because the Turner test was the overriding framework; once the first factor was satisfied, the rest fell into place "like dominoes."
173 Unlike in Youngberg, the court gave only cursory consideration to how the challenged policies advanced state interests; there is no indication of how the court came to its conclusion that a sexually explicit letter from the plaintiff's girlfriend was detrimental to his therapy. The court's ultimate holding that the policy was rationally related to legitimate interests 174 thus comes as no surprise. Even a court that views civil commitment as different from imprisonment will apply the prison standard, raising the question of what civil status means. In Fogle v. Bellow-Smith, the clinical leader of a sex offender treatment center entered a "read order" for the plaintiff's mail after staff members discovered that he had received a phone card from his father with a number preprogrammed for a sex line, in violation of the center's policy against unauthorized exchanges and gifts. 175 The district court stated that civil commitment can be distinguished from imprisonment, but nevertheless applied Turner. 176 For the purposes of qualified immunity, the court found that the plaintiff did not have an established First Amendment right to receive mail without interference.
177
The court began by establishing that the plaintiff's confidential communications with his attorney are clearly protected, noting that prisoners' legal mail is protected, and "the standard would not be lower for civil detainees, who are generally subject to a higher level of protection [than prisoners]." 178 As to whether the plaintiff has a right to non-legal correspondence free from scrutiny, and whether the delay in receipt of mail caused by the read order was a constitutional violation, the court relied on the Turner standard, as 171 Id. 172 Id. 176 Id. at *7, *8. 177 Id. at *8. 178 Id. at *7.
articulated by a decision in an Eighth Circuit prisoner case. 179 The court found that the Turner analysis was "applicable in the context of a civil detainee," noting that "in determining the legitimacy of the state interest, the classification of the Plaintiff is significant."
180
The court in Fogle then used Youngberg "to assess the legitimate government interest," reasoning that the court's role is to determine whether the restraint was the "result of professional judgment." 181 The court deferred to the judgment of the Center's personnel, quickly concluding, "the Court believes that the treatment objectives of MSOTC are comparable to the safety concerns of prisons." 182 The decision gives no indication that the court examined the qualifications of the decisionmakers or whether their decision was a substantial departure from practices in similar facilities. So, while the decision nods to Youngberg, the extreme deference embodied by Turner decided the case, as the court accepted without question the administrators' asserted justifications. The court accepted the commitment-center administrators' argument that reading the mail was a necessary response to the plaintiff's alleged breaking of phone card rules. Finding that the center "stated a legitimate government interest in reviewing Plaintiff's non-legal mail, to ensure that Plaintiff did not continue to violate the rules regarding phone cards," 183 the court did not explain how reading the content of mail related to two rules infractions-use of a phone card to call a sex line and an unauthorized gift or exchange of a phone card to another offender-that appear unrelated to the written content of correspondence. 184 The extreme deference of Turner requires no such explanation, and thus infringements on free speech are easy to defend.
A third decision involving mail restrictions takes a more considered approach to determining the standard for a civilly committed sex offender's First Amendment claims. The court's conclusion that Turner applies is deceptive because its application
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of Turner eschews the usual extreme deference; this perhaps is an acknowledgement that the status of civil committees is distinct from that of prisoners and deserves a lesser degree of deference. In Willis v. Smith, 185 the district court found that staff at a civil commitment facility had violated the rights of a sex offender by opening a publication mailed to him when he was not present and confiscating it without ever informing him of their actions. The plaintiff's friend had mailed him a book that advocated the abolition of polygraphy, and the facility staff had confiscated it without informing him of its delivery because they believed that its contents were antitherapeutic (the facility used polygraph tests extensively as part of its treatment).
186 Interestingly, the plaintiff argued that his status was much like a prisoner, and that he should therefore enjoy the protections he had enjoyed when he was in prison, including prompt notification and a clear process for appeal if the prison administration deemed incoming mail to be contraband. 187 The defendants argued that whether he is considered a patient or prisoner, the constitutional analysis would be the same, and the court agreed. Indeed, after considering the statuses of pretrial detainees and persons confined to state mental institutions after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, the court concluded that the status of civilly committed sex offenders was substantially similar to that of prisoners because, like prisoners, they have been convicted of a crime. 188 For this reason, the prisoner precedents applied. The court found that the plaintiff may be subjected to even more restrictive policies than prisoners, in light of the facility's interest in maintaining not only security, but also "the integrity of the treatment environment." 189 However, after concluding that the plaintiff's rights may be even more limited than prisoners', the court disagreed with the facility's professional judgments, even while proclaiming its deference to institutional decisionmaking. The court held that facility administrators failed to assert a legitimate institutional interest for opening the plaintiff's mail outside of his presence. 190 This examination of the institutional interest is more searching than the usual application of Turner. While the defendants asserted that they opened the package outside of the plaintiff's presence because of 185 No. C04-4012-MWB, 2005 WL 550528 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 28, 2005) . 186 Id. at *3-4. 187 Id. at *8. 188 Id. at *10. 189 Id. at *12. 190 Id. at *16. the high volume of packages during the holidays, unlike in Turner, the court did not view administrative efficiency as a factor in its analysis. As to the facility's decision to deny the plaintiff access to the entire book, the court found that only some parts of the book could be constitutionally withheld from the plaintiff, and that the defendant's efforts to deny information from specific sources was based on "personal biases and prejudices rather than upon their professional judgment."
191 While the court deferred to the administrators' professional judgment that portions of the book on polygraph counter measures were anti-therapeutic, noting that the plaintiff presented no contrary evidence at trial, the court disputed administrators' assertions that materials on the validity of polygraphy would cause other patients at the facility to refuse to take polygraph tests. 192 In doing so, the court disregarded Turner's "ripple effect" factor. Since the impact on other patients would, in the court's view, be minimal, the infringement on the plaintiff's constitutional rights by denying him the sections of the book questioning polygraphy was not justified.
193
While this decision presents a possibility of a searching inquiry with regard to civilly committed sex offenders' First Amendment claims, quite unlike the Turner standard's usual extreme deference toward prison administrators, it has been cited by at least one other federal district court to support a finding that civilly committed sex offenders are like prisoners and that Turner applies to civilly committed sex offenders' claims regarding mail policies. 194 The latter decision fails to note that Willis's version of Turner looks like an altogether different standard, as it uncharacteristically eschews extreme deference. Compared to the court decisions on free speech, the free exercise of religion decisions are generally less tolerant of First Amendment infringements. The standards courts apply still approximate those applied to prisoners' claims. The difference is that while infringements on civilly committed sex offenders' free speech rights are permissible under the Turner standard, courts are more protective of the free exercise of religion for prisoners and civilly committed sex offenders alike.
B. Free Exercise of Religion Claims
Decisions on civilly committed sex offenders' free exercise of religion claims likewise echo courts' reasoning in decisions on prisoners' free exercise of religion claims, but with these claims, plaintiffs are much more likely to prevail, much like prisoner-plaintiffs. The courts rely on two standards: the Turner test and a federal statute that incorporates and expands the First Amendment protections of free exercise of religion for institutionalized persons. Both tests are also used for prisoners' free exercise of religion claims.
With the passage of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 196 (RLUIPA), the landscape for prisoners' free exercise claims has shifted considerably from the precedent set by O'Lone.
197 RLUIPA was passed by Congress after its predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 198 was invalidated as applied to the states. 199 The Supreme Court held that the RFRA exceeded Congress's remedial powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 200 RLUIPA thus far has withstood constitutional challenges: its scope is narrower than RFRA, applying only to land use and institutionalized persons. The provisions of the statute relating to the free exercise of religion by institutionalized persons were enacted under Congress' interstate commerce and (1997) . 200 Id.
spending powers. 201 The statute prohibits the imposition of "substantial burdens" on the religious practices of people confined to institutions unless the government can prove that the burden furthers a compelling government interest by the least restrictive means. 202 RLUIPA therefore "incorporates and exceeds the Constitution's basic protections of religious exercise," expressly referencing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and establishing the strict scrutiny standard of review for claims under the statute. 203 At least three federal courts have assumed without discussion that RLUIPA applies to civilly committed sex offenders, 204 but it is worth examining whether the statute applies to them and, if so, under what category they are included because these questions implicate fundamental questions about sex offender civil commitment. RLUIPA applies to state-run institutions in four categories: (1) facilities for persons who are mentally ill, mentally retarded, or disabled; (2) "a jail, prison [,] or other correctional facility"; (3) "a pretrial detention facility"; or (4) a facility for juveniles in some circumstances. 205 RLUIPA might apply to civilly committed sex offenders under the first or second definition but both possibilities raise constitutional difficulties. As to the application of RLUIPA to persons who are mentally ill, state statutes providing for civil commitment of sex offenders have used several variations of mental abnormality to justify civil commitment, as well as to determine criteria for commitment. Courts have struggled with the definition of mental impairment, as opposed to mental illness, as it pertains to the civil commitment of sex offenders and persons with mental illness, respectively. Critics argue that the definitions used for sex offenders are so blurry that serious constitutional questions are implicated. 206 Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act, for example,
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[Vol. 12:283 defines a sexually violent predator as "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence." 207 In Hendricks, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court's holding that the statutory requirement of "mental abnormality" failed to satisfy due process requirements that civilly committed individuals have a serious mental illness. 208 The decision allows states great latitude in how mental impairment is defined. 209 While the American Psychiatric Association has protested the "unacceptable misuse of psychiatry" to civilly commit sex offenders, "serv[ing] essentially nonmedical purposes," 210 states remain free to commit sex offenders based on diagnoses which arguably apply to large numbers of incarcerated people, whether or not they have been convicted of sex offenses. 211 Whether courts would view RLUIPA as applying to civilly committed sex offenders depends on their interpretation of the statute's term "mental illness." If their interpretation is broad enough to encompass "mental impairment," civilly committed sex offenders likely are covered by RLUIPA.
RLUIPA might apply to sex offenders under RLUIPA's "correctional facility" category. The statute does not define "correctional facility." In defining "correctional institution," Black's Law Dictionary says "[s]ee prison," and it further defines "[c]orrection" as " [t] he punishment and treatment of a criminal offender through a program of imprisonment, parole, and probation." 212 Under Hendricks, sex offender civil commitment would appear not to fall into RLUIPA's correctional facility category because correctional facilities are at least partially punitive. 213 But because courts considering RLUIPA claims brought by civilly committed sex offenders have also relied on prison free exercise cases and on Turner, without questioning the prison standard's applicability, an argument can be made that sex offender civil commitment does belong in RLUIPA's correctional facility category. RLUIPA's definition of institutionalized persons includes persons in "other correctional facilit[ies]"; 214 it might also be argued that civil commitment centers, being post-correctional facilities, are included in this category.
RLUIPA's protections ought to extend to civilly committed sex offenders because, while Congress may not have anticipated sex offender civil commitment when it set out statutory categories of institutions, civilly committed sex offenders are, in fact, institutionalized. In a case upholding RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause challenge, the Supreme Court described the institutions covered by the statute as those:
in which the government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian society and severely disabling to private religious exercise. RLUIPA thus protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government's permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.
215
By this description, sex offenders who have been confined civilly, and whose physical movement, food, physical possessions, and attendance at religious services are subject to the control of commitment facility administrators, are institutionalized persons.
In analyzing the Free Exercise Clause claims of civilly committed sex offenders, two district courts applied an unusually deferential version of the Turner prison standard, and another never reached the First Amendment issue because it held that the challenged practices violated RLUIPA. In all three decisions, the analyses employed are identical to prison free exercise of religion cases. 221 The Thompson court's reasoning closely paralleled that in Beerheide: after establishing that the plaintiff's beliefs were sincerely held, both courts found that two asserted penological interests-conserving prison resources and preventing inmate conflict-were legitimate, 222 but that the state provided insufficient evidence to show that the challenged policies furthered those legitimate penological goals. 223 The court in Thompson additionally found that a third asserted governmental interest-"rehabilitation of the patient by teaching financial responsibility"-failed to even satisfy the first prong of the Turner standard: the requirement that Thompson, unlike others, must pay for his meal punished him "solely on the basis of his faith." 224 The court in Beerheide cited Turner for the proposition that prison officials "must still make their case by presenting evidence, however minimal that evidence might be."
225 While this approach puts more of a burden on the state than the usual application of 218 Thompson court did not mention whether civil commitment might differ from prison, or whether penological interests might be different from those of administering a civil commitment center. Even when the state asserted it had a legitimate interest in rehabilitation, the court failed to take the Hendricks purpose-is-treatmentnot-punishment bait, dismissing that interest in relation to the required payment for kosher food, and continuing to apply the prison standard from Beerheide.
227
A recent district court decision in New York similarly applied the Turner test to a civilly committed sex offender's claim that his free exercise of religion was infringed by a state psychiatric hospital's failure to provide him halal meals and refusal to let him pray. 228 In Abdul-Matiyn v. Pataki, the court denied a motion to dismiss filed by staff and administrators of a state psychiatric hospital First Amendment claims brought by a convicted sex offender who had been civilly committed there. 229 The court cited a case that held, "[t]he Free Exercise clause extends 'into other aspects of prison life including, pertinently, that of an inmate's diet . . . , ' " 230 implicitly assuming that the status of the plaintiff was the same as that of a prisoner. In fact, Abdul-Matiyn was a sex offender who, after his release from prison, had been arrested and detained in jail due to a parole violation, then transferred to a psychiatric facility and civilly committed past the time he was scheduled for release. 231 The court applied the Turner test, as articulated by a Second Circuit prison case. 232 In that case, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, denying the defendants' motion to dismiss because they had failed to assert any legitimate penological interest to justify denying the plaintiff halal meals, religious texts, and prayer 226 Perhaps this application of Turner is less deferential because Congress demonstrated its intent to provide extra protections for the free exercise of religion. 231 Id. at *2-3. 232 Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that Rastafarians' religious practice of leaving hair unshorn can be reasonably accommodated by pulling their hair back rather than enforcing a haircut policy but that prison officials have legitimate penological interests for prohibiting prayer groups that are unsupervised by non-prisoner religious leaders and for prohibiting the wearing of crowns). and filed a complaint. 240 At that point, the facility provided him halal meat but maintained that it was not obligated to do so. 241 The plaintiff sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief against both the prison where he had been incarcerated and the facility where he continued to be civilly committed. 242 The court assumed that RLUIPA applied to civil commitment, analyzing the applicability of RLUIPA to the plaintiff's claim only on the issue of whether facilities that did not receive federal funds were subject to RLUIPA. 243 The court approached the claims against the prison and the civil commitment facility differently only to the extent that, because the plaintiff was no longer in prison, his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against prison officials were moot. 244 The court then analyzed the plaintiff's claim against civil commitment center officials under RLUIPA.
245 With Bilal's "sincerely held religious belief" undisputed, the court found that his religious practices were substantially burdened. 246 Citing the Cutter decision on the same issue, the court reasoned that evidence showed that eating halal meat is a regular practice of many Muslims, 247 and the state had failed to demonstrate compelling reasons to deny the plaintiff halal meat or that such denial is the least restrictive means to achieve its purposes. 248 The court then found that the state failed to show that the challenged policy furthered the asserted governmental interests of reducing costs, 249 streamlining food production, 250 or limiting security risks. 251 The court rejected the defendants' assertion that the Turner standard should be applied to determine whether the policy is the least restrictive means of achieving government goals: "When Congress passed RLUIPA, it replaced the Turner rational basis standard of review with a strict scrutiny standard. A core problem with civil commitment is the underlying constitutional infirmity of civilly committing sex offenders when treatment-the characteristic that allegedly distinguishes civil commitment from imprisonment-has not been proven to reduce recidivism and is often a legislative justification rather than a genuine goal. 255 Even beyond the question of the efficacy of treatment, much of the science underlying civil commitment is suspect. Michael Perlin has argued that the Hendricks decision, like much mental disability jurisprudence, is characterized by what he terms "pretextuality": "courts accept, either implicitly or explicitly, testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest decisionmaking." 256 Other scholars have noted that the use of dubious scientific claims to justify civil commitment constitutes another variation of pretextuality, one that "provides a legitimizing cover, allowing the state to cast the constitutionally doubtful preventive detention of dangerous individuals as constitutionally safe civil commitment."
257
The Hendricks decision hinges on treatment-because the statute's purpose was treatment and not punishment, the Court found 254 See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text. 255 See supra note 18. 256 Perlin, supra note 42, at 1252. 257 Prentky, Science on Trial, supra note 58, at 361. that it passed constitutional muster. But treatment was merely a pretext for the Kansas civil commitment statute. The Court ignored facts that showed that treatment was not the bona fide goal of Kansas's confinement of Hendricks, 258 and failed to consider compelling evidence that the treatment of sex offenders was entirely unproven. 259 Twelve years after Hendricks, the efficacy of sex offender treatment is still far from widely accepted. 260 Although courts are reluctant to become involved in "battles of the experts" over whether treatment works, given the high constitutional values at stake, the judiciary cannot afford to ignore the contested state of scientific research on the treatment of sex offenders in civil commitment. 261 The law has developed tools to evaluate the acceptability of scientific evidence, 262 and courts must be cautious about premising decisions on unproven science.
Scholars have argued that science plays an especially important role in civil commitment proceedings, in which scientific testimony on diagnoses and future risk of harmful behavior are determinative of indefinite confinement. 263 The question of what is treatment 268 are deeply contested. While diagnosis and predictions of future dangerousness are the elements that determine whether a sex offender will face indeterminate detention, the efficacy of treatment is the linchpin to the constitutionality of the civil commitment enterprise.
269
If one accepts for a moment the premise that civil commitment is not punitive and is on that basis distinguishable from imprisonment, the question becomes what standard should apply to civilly committed sex offenders' First Amendment claims. An application of the Turner test with civil-confinement-related interests simply substituted for penological interests is inappropriate because Turner drew on a long line of prison cases. 270 The great deference to prison administrators' goals stems from the wellestablished primacy of prison security as a penological goal. 271 Because Hendricks held that the purpose of sex offender civil confinement is not punitive, 272 courts would need to look to First Amendment free speech cases outside of the incarceration context to develop a standard for analyzing the rights of civilly committed sex offenders. 273 One potential model is the treatment of students' First Amendment rights at school.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, the Supreme Court declared that neither students nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolwww.csom.org/pubs/assessment_brief.pdf. It also noted that the tool can produce both false-positive and false-negative results. Id.
268 JANUS, supra note 7, at 53-54. "There is no consensus about the efficacy of sex offender treatment." Id. Janus notes that some experts believe intensive supervision in the community is the best strategy to prevent recidivism. 269 A recent case points out deeply troubling methods of predicting of future dangerousness. In In re M.D., the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a civilly committed sex offender's petition for discharge after ten years in civil confinement. 757 N.W.2d 559 (N.D. 2008). One expert testified, based on actuarial assessments, that M.D. was unlikely to reoffend. Id. at 560. The other expert found that his treatment had thus far been ineffective, largely on the basis of the petitioner's consensual sexual relationship with another civilly committed man who was described as "young-looking." Id. The dissent pointed out that the court's decision would indefinitely confine a person based on a homosexual relationship for which the petitioner could not be sanctioned criminally, and that if after ten years, the petitioner had not completed treatment, the efficacy of such treatment was questionable. Id. at 563-64 (Kapsner, J., dissenting) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 270 See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 271 Id. 272 See supra Section III. 273 Because the civil commitment of sex offenders falls within RLUIPA's application to institutions, that statute provides the standard for free exercise claims.
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[Vol. 12:283 house gate." 274 The Court held that freedom of speech may be restricted by school administrators only with a showing that such expression "materially and substantially" interferes with appropriate discipline. 275 Tinker acknowledges that students' First Amendment rights are affected by the "special characteristics of the school environment," noting that schools educate "the young for citizenship" but that school officials have the "comprehensive authority. . .to prescribe and control conduct in the schools," albeit in a manner "consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards. 276 The Tinker rule has been modified by subsequent decisions holding that school officials can restrict vulgar and lewd student speech, 277 school-sponsored student speech, 278 and student speech that promotes (or can be reasonably interpreted as promoting) drug use, 279 regardless of whether such speech has caused a disruption. A standard that similarly acknowledges the right of civilly committed sex offenders to speak freely unless such expression materially and substantially interferes with the administration of civil commitment centers would put a higher burden on administrators to justify restrictions than the extremely deferential Turner test.
Clearly the functions and characteristics of civil commitment facilities are entirely different from those of schools. A First Amendment rule based on Tinker must take into account the special characteristics of civil commitment facilities, including security concerns and their underlying purposes of providing treatment and incapacitating sex offenders. With these characteristics and purposes in mind, courts might conduct a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the speech a commitment facility seeks to limit would substantially and materially interfere with the center's administration. In Tinker, the Court noted that the donning of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War by high school students was a "silent, passive expression of opinion" 280 and that there was "no evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the schools' work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone." 281 The Court also found that there was no evidence that the actions resulted in violence or threats of violence or the disruption of classes. 282 In the sex offender commitment facility context, the Court in Rivera might have looked to whether the sexually explicit letter from the plaintiff's girlfriend threatened to disrupt the administration of the center. 283 The letter was presumably mailed from one consenting adult to another. While the court noted that sexually explicit materials might interfere with treatment goals, a fact-specific inquiry would determine whether the letter undermined the plaintiff's treatment. Such an inquiry would likely raise difficult questions, reminiscent of Youngberg: should a facility's assertion that such a letter was contrary to treatment goals be accepted at face value? In Tinker, the Court questioned the school's assertion that the wearing of armbands was inherently disruptive, a reminder that the judiciary has not always deferred so completely to institutional administrators. A court is more likely to follow the considerable deference to hospital administrators in Youngberg, however, as the civil commitment of people with mental illnesses is more analogous to sex offender civil commitment than is a public secondary school, characterized by the Court in Tinker as "a marketplace of ideas." 284 Even if courts gave more deference to civil commitment administrators than to the school administrators in Tinker, once the extreme deference of Turner is removed, a global policy that bans all sexually explicit materials would become suspect. Where the goal is treatment, not punishment, a strong argument can be made that policies in treatment centers should be individualized, since sex offenders are a heterogeneous group. 285 In prisons, by contrast, policies address universal institutional needs, such as security. Individual facts might still support interference with mail in a civil commitment facility. If the facts showed that a civilly committed sex offender was sexually coercing others at the commitment center, and such behavior was linked to his possession of sexually explicit materials, a court might find that the restriction on speech was justified because of material and substantial interference with the ad- 282 Id. 284 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512. 285 CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., supra note 272, at 1 (stating that comprehensive assessments are needed to determine how best to manage individual sex offenders because they are a "heterogeneous group" with differences in "the types of victims they target, their reasons for engaging in such behavior, the degree to which they are motivated to change, the types of interventions that will be most effective for them, and their risk of reoffending.").
any such restriction is only justified by "clear and present danger." 289 The future danger to public safety posed by any individual sex offender is speculative, but the danger to such an offender's First Amendment rights, by contrast, is manifest. First Amendment rights are being abridged by the application of the prison standard to persons with civil status-clearly, presently, and dangerously.
VII. CONCLUSION
The state cannot have it both ways. If confinement of a sexually violent predator is civil for the purposes of evaluation under the Ex Post Facto Clause, that confinement is civil for the purposes of determining the rights to which the detainee is entitled while confined. Civil status means civil status, with all the . . . rights that accompany it. 290 Presently, civilly committed sex offenders lack the protections of the criminal justice system, but endure all of the restrictions of imprisonment. They are in an untenable legal limbo. When the Ninth Circuit addressed a challenge to the conditions of confinement by a sex offender awaiting a commitment hearing, the court held that if conditions prior to confinement are worse than conditions in confinement, the challenged conditions are presumed to be unconstitutionally punitive, "[o]r to put it more colorfully, purgatory cannot be worse than hell."
291 While the Ninth Circuit was referring to a detainee's substantive due process claim prior to civil commitment, the same principle holds for the First Amendment rights of civilly committed sex offenders. With their double jeopardy and ex post facto claims denied, but their First Amendment claims treated like those of prisoners, civilly committed sex offenders are in a kind of purgatory. Their constitutional rights are curtailed under the deferential Turner standard as though they were prisoners, but they lack the procedural protections the Constitution affords prisoners. The state is indeed having it both ways.
